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This article begins with a brief evocation of the main features of the
legacy left to us by Raúl Prebisch, not only from the strictly intellectual
point of view, but also as a model of humanism. It then goes on to deal
with the present situation of the world, with special emphasis on trade,
and highlights the return of a war economy mentality and the instability
reigning in the oil market, both of which militate against the greater
investment needed in order for the world economy to grow at a
satisfactory rate. It notes that in spite of all this, in the present
circumstances there has nevertheless been some recovery of growth
and revitalization of trade. Finally, it analyses the structural changes
which have taken place or are under way in the world trade system and,
in particular, the extent to which those changes resemble those that
Prebisch hoped for or fall short of his expectations.
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In this article I should like first of all to recall what, in
my opinion, are the main features of the legacy left to
us by Raúl Prebisch, not only from the strictly
intellectual point of view, but also as a model of
humanism. Secondly, I should like to refer to what we
might call the “here and now” —the present situation,
what is going on in the world of today— with special
emphasis on trade, which is my main area of
experience. Due to the circumstances of my diplomatic
life, my long-standing link with trade has been perhaps
my most outstanding characteristic, unlike my four
predecessors in UNCTAD. They did not have direct
experience with the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (GATT), as I did in my posts as chairman of the
GATT Council and the GATT Contracting Parties and as
a negotiator, and this experience has perhaps helped
me to develop a different outlook which can only be
gained through experience in the realities of negotiating
trade agreements.
Thirdly, I will review the structural changes which
have taken place or are under way in the world trade
system, and especially the extent to which those
changes resemble those that Prebisch hoped for, or else
fall short of his expectations. Finally, by way of a brief
conclusion, I will say a few words about the present
situation of Latin America, which is where I come from
and where I hope to be living again very soon and to
keep on collaborating with ECLAC from closer at hand.
II
Prebisch’s intellectual and humanistic legacy
“…when we contemplate the times we are living in today it is hard
to be optimistic. I believe, however, that we must keep up our struggle,
which does not only concern the international context but also our own
countries. It is not just a question of a new international economic
order but of a new economic, social and ethical order at the national
level too. These are the great problems that we must solve in Latin
America, though they will entail harsh sacrifices” (Prebisch, 1983).
These were Raúl Prebisch’s closing words, on 6 July
1982, at the end of the series of lectures organized by
UNCTAD in his honour in Geneva. They highlight what I
consider to be the most important aspect of all that he
has bequeathed to us: his ethical and moral commitment
to promoting the social interests of Latin Americans.
I used another quotation from the same lecture at
the beginning of my address at the seminar organized
by ECLAC in Santiago, Chile, to commemorate the
centenary of Prebisch’s birth. I entitled that address
“The Globalization of Raúl Prebisch”, explaining that
I was using the term globalization in a dual sense:
“first, to describe Prebisch’s personal and intellectual
progression towards an increasingly universal
dimension: from his native Argentina to Latin America,
and from there to the world economic system as a
whole, in UNCTAD. Second, to suggest that one of the
best ways of remembering this great Latin American
is to try to imagine what globalization would be like
had it followed his design and intentions, rather than
turning out as it has, generating and provoking a
growing movement of massive rejection …” (Ricupero,
2001).
What I want to refer to now is not the process of
evolution which led Prebisch’s thinking to extend to
increasingly broad areas, to the point where it covered
the whole of the world economic system, but to the
   This article reproduces the text of a master class delivered by
the author at the Economic Commission for Latin America and the
Caribbean (ECLAC) in Santiago, Chile, on 27 August 2004 as part of
the Fourth Raúl Prebisch Memorial Lecture Series.
C E P A L  R E V I E W  8 4  •   D E C E M B E R  2 0 0 4
THE RENEWED CURRENCY OF RAÚL PREBISCH • RUBENS RICUPERO
9
way that thinking remained valid over time, and the
constant updating it has undergone: what we might call
its renewed currency. This is not to say that he never
made a mistake, that his ideas were timeless, or that
we should forget what he himself said in his
contribution to Pioneers in Development: that “my
thinking on development has gone through successive
stages under the influence of changing conditions and
the broadening of my own experience” (Prebisch,
1984).
Far from allowing himself to be immobilized by
immutable ideologies or ideas, “What is noteworthy”
says Jagdish N. Bhagwati, “is the way he has been able
to interact with his economic and political environment
and thus grow as an economist” (Bhagwati, 1984).
The ongoing currency of an idea is not measured
by drawing up a balance-sheet of hits and misses, but
rather by the ongoing relevance of the topics and
concerns it deals with, and perhaps more by the
questions it raises than the answers it gives. Thus, all
the main themes of Prebisch’s future work and of the
debate in progress today were already present in The
Economic Development of Latin America and its
principal problems (Prebisch, 1949): the centre-
periphery dualism; his “splendid terminology”, as
Bhagwati called it; and the vital importance of
technical progress, the link between foreign trade and
development, foreign investment, import substitution,
interdependence, and commodity prices.
Another basic factor in the influence of Prebisch’s
example was also clearly visible in that now-distant
study: the emphasis he places on making the actual
prevailing conditions the starting point for creating a
vision adapted to the circumstances of space and time.
As he wrote at that time: “The reflective knowledge
of external matters must not be confused with mental
subjection to alien ideas, from which we are only very
slowly learning to free ourselves” (Prebisch, 1949).
Thirty-three years later, in Prebisch’s lecture at UNCTAD
in 1982, he was to return to this approach: “In those
years of the Great Depression, a phenomenon of
intellectual emancipation began in Latin America
which involved looking at the theories of the “centre”
with a critical eye. Not with an attitude of intellectual
arrogance —for those theories nevertheless have great
value— but with a realization that they need to be
subjected to critical study. (…) it is this critical study
which makes us strive to seek our own paths to
development —paths that do not involve imitating
anyone— and to try to understand those conditions and
meet the economic, social and moral demands of
development —in other words, paths based on equity”
(Prebisch, 1983).
He never gave up his attitude of consistently
trying to judge theories in terms of their practical
results, making that a test of their viability. His
references to what was going on in the world —in the
countries of the “centre”, in the United States, and most
often of all, in Latin America— made him a thinker
who was always open and willing to accept change,
new developments and self-criticism. Living as he did
in the same years when Ortega y Gasset coined his
famous phrase “man is himself and his circumstances”,
he was an outstanding embodiment of the American
condition as well as of his own personal and national
situation.
In this sense, it is strange that in his essay on his
“five stages” (Prebisch, 1984) he does not enlarge on
his own experience of “globalization” (corresponding
to the fourth stage: that of his period in UNCTAD), and
this did not escape the attention of two of the
commentators on that text (Albert Fishlow and Jagdish
N. Bhagwati). This should not be seen, however, as a
reflection of a stronger sense of frustration or failure
regarding that stage in his intellectual career, since his
last texts on Latin America at the time of the military
dictatorships and the debt crisis in the “lost decade”
of the 1980s were not exactly filled with hope either.
The explanation, I believe, is simply that he had to
return every time to the Latin American environment
in order to nourish his understanding of the world on
the basis of a reality which he knew so well. His Latin
American roots were so deep that this became a habit,
perhaps unconsciously, to such a point that in a text
intended in principle for an international audience and
dealing with the developing countries and the periphery
as a whole, at the end he moved from the general (the
international level) to the specific, saying “These are
the great problems that we must solve in Latin
America, though they will entail harsh sacrifices”
(Prebisch, 1983), as though those problems were not
the same on other continents.
In the same text, he expressed his regret that “when
these great years of prosperity came and we allowed
ourselves to be dazzled by the centres, this effort to seek
our own ways was interrupted” (Prebisch, 1983). In a
surprising preview of some present trends, he criticized
the fact that “the mutual trade initiatives among the
countries of the region were considerably weakened
because we believed that a new era was dawning for the
world in which exports of manufactures to the centres
would solve the great problems of the external
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bottleneck ….. We let ourselves be seduced, as is
perhaps only natural, by the consequences of the
prosperity of the centres. The pendulum swung to the
other extreme: no more import substitution, no more
mutual trade efforts, our whole future lay in outward-
oriented growth and in taking advantage of the markets
of the centres” (Prebisch, 1983).
These words describe what is happening today
even better than what was happening in 1982, which
was to be marked, a few months after the UNCTAD
meeting in July of that year, by the beginning of the
long external debt crisis of the region, with the
Mexican collapse in October and the ensuing lost
decade or decade and a half. It would not be hard to
find further examples of Prebisch’s extraordinarily
perceptive and almost prophetic foresight and his
capacity to predict many phenomena which are now
of more obviously decisive importance than they were
when he described them.
Instead of making an exhaustive list, however, I
will now highlight two fundamental and permanent
aspects of Prebisch’s intellectual legacy. The first is what
might be called his attitude towards the world: his search
for a truly Latin American path, based on our own actual
situation, as one of his main criteria for critically
appraising and adapting imported theories and therapies.
The second is what lies at the root of the criticisms
he levelled against the excesses committed in the Latin
American governments’ radical change of course in the
1980s, which he sums up as follows: “…. looking
around us, we have turned our backs on a policy which,
in my opinion, with all its undoubted defects and faults,
we should have continued to follow, taking advantage
of our accumulated experience in order to perfect it”
(Prebisch, 1983). The reason for his rejection of what
he called “conventional theories” was that they took
no account of the social structure and its continual
changes. Apart from the shortcomings he identified in
the explanatory capacity of conventional theories, even
with respect to the economic system of the centres,
what seemed most serious to him was that, when
applied to Latin America, those formulas would make
it necessary to leave out “the great mass of the
population which industrialization had reached only to
a very incipient extent” (Prebisch, 1983).
The process of marginalization begins with the
frantic imitation of the centres’ advanced forms of
consumption by the elite social groups of the Latin
American periphery. Thanks to the enormous
disparities in income distribution, those groups were
able to rapidly assimilate the centres’ forms of
consumption. This occurred “to the detriment of the
accumulation of reproductive capital, which is the only
thing that can solve our problems of social exclusion:
that is to say, the fact that great masses of the
population are relegated to the bottom of the system,
with low incomes, very low productivity, and a large
number of unemployed, because not enough
reproductive capital has been accumulated to increase
the employment and productivity of the masses”
(Prebisch, 1983).
That description of the Latin American situation
was penned exactly 22 years ago: the space of a
generation. We would all like to be able to say that it is
no more than that: something from the past, now
overtaken by progress, that ultimately belongs to a time
which is now on the way to oblivion. Can we still
maintain such a position, however, when we read the
Preliminary Overview of the Economies of Latin
America and the Caribbean 2003 (ECLAC, 2003),
published in December of last year? This overview
contains the following words, which deplore the fact
that, in spite of the growth registered in 2003, the
region’s per capita GDP remained flat, at a level 1.5%
below that of 1997: “The six years of negative per capita
growth caused social damage that will take time to
reverse. There are 20 million more poor Latin Americans
in 2003 than there were in 1997. Unemployment has
increased by two percentage points during this period
and is now at 10.7%” (ECLAC, 2003). Elsewhere, the
same publication informs us that in that same year, 44%
of the region’s population was living in poverty.
I am well aware, of course, that these disturbing
figures are the result of a particularly adverse set of
factors including, among others, the financial collapse
in Argentina in 2001 and the economic and social
consequences of the political problems in Venezuela
and other countries. I am also well aware that they
represent a region-wide average and that there are
comforting exceptions in which countries have
significantly reduced poverty and increased growth
thanks to sound macroeconomic policies, as in the case
of Chile, which all of us admire. It is likely, too, that
the more promising growth prospects in 2004 and, I
hope, the coming years in general will soon bring
positive results in terms of reducing unemployment.
Nevertheless, there are undeniable realities which
cannot be ignored and which make it possible to argue
that Prebisch’s views continue to be valid today.
Thus, armed with this legacy which permits us to
take a clear-cut stand, with a moral commitment to
socially equitable development and with a critical
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intellectual attitude devoid of ideological prejudices
and based on our real situation, we will now close this
section and go on to the next one, inspired by another
exhortation of Prebisch, which formed the title of the
lecture he gave in Medellín shortly before his death:
“It is imperative to renew our ideas”.
III
The here and now
This article is based on the Prebisch lecture I delivered
at ECLAC on 27 August 2004, three years after the events
held at ECLAC to commemorate the centenary of
Prebisch’s birth. On that first occasion, I spoke on 28
August 2001, exactly 15 days before the terrorist
attacks that changed the world on 11 September of that
year.
Of course I had then no idea of what was going
to happen in the world or the changes that would take
place from that moment. I will not try to make an
exhaustive list of those changes, but will merely refer
to a few of them which have had an influence on the
world economic and trade situation, which is my main
subject.
I should like to note first of all that what has really
changed is that we have once again come to live in a
war economy. In some respects, it sometimes seems
that we have gone back to the 1970s, when the war
economy due to the Vietnam conflict combined with
other factors which are not present today, such as
inflation.
At the present time, we have at least two
conditions which are similar to those prevailing at that
time: a war economy, once again combined with great
instability in the oil markets. When I speak of a war
economy, what I mean is that we have now left behind
us the mental atmosphere in which the prevailing idea
was that what mattered was economic globalization.
Between the fall of the Berlin Wall and the terrorist
attacks of 11 September, the factors which were
considered important were the market, globalization,
and the facilitation of all kinds of transactions. We have
now passed from that mental attitude to another which
is dominated by the concern for security. The United
States claims that it is engaged in a war on terrorism,
and we have no idea when that war will end. In less
than three years we have had a war in Afghanistan and
another in Iraq, and we are already reading in the
newspapers that there are plans, not to go to war, but
to destabilize countries such as Iran. These are serious
plans announced in such respected papers as the
London Times.
This is a period of almost constant mobilization,
in which one conflict leads not to peace but to a new
conflict, with ever-increasing use of human, military
and financial resources. How will all this end? I have
no idea, and I do not wish to make any predictions. I
am simply noting the fact that there is a war economy,
whose first consequence is the excessive strengthening
of the State and its powers. The State is being
strengthened vis-à-vis the market and civil society, and
it is being strengthened because military, strategic,
security and political considerations have become a
question of life or death. As Napoleon said, “the
intendancy goes on”: the economy, trade, finance, etc.
must all go on.
The State lays out resources to strengthen its
security. This is why, in the United States electoral
campaign, concern over the fiscal deficit is less
important than strategic concerns. This is why
extraordinary increases in budget allocations are
approved in order to create new capabilities in respect
of external or internal security. It thus represents a far-
reaching change. I do not know how long it will last,
but in my opinion, it is incompatible in the long term
with the original idea of globalization.
What was the idée-force of globalization? It was
the belief that while frontiers would continue to exist,
they would become irrelevant because transactions,
which would be increasingly easy, would not be carried
out from one side of a border to the other (cross-border
transactions) but would leapfrog them (trans-border
transactions), like the electronic transactions effected
over the Internet, which are not registered by any kind
of customs authority. That was the conviction
underlying globalization: that goods would transcend
frontiers, as would companies (but not workers, for this
was never added), loans and investments.
If the excessive concern with security lasts too
long, it will not put an end to globalization, but it will
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raise more obstacles to it. Anyone who has visited the
United States recently knows what I am talking about,
so not many more examples are needed. There has been
a radical and important change: a return to the spirit
of a war economy. What happened in an area of high
strategic value for oil production obviously has an
impact on the price of that product. Among the many
reasons (explicit or implicit) given in order to explain
the war in Iraq —the existence of weapons of mass
destruction, possible links with terrorist movements—
there was always the idea that a pacified, democratic
Iraq would be one more guarantee of a steady supply
of oil. This reason too has proved to be false, however,
because now the frequent interruptions in Iraq’s oil
production are one of the factors behind the volatility
of oil prices, together with the increased demand of
countries such as China, the problems in Russia over
the Yukos company, the political problems in
Venezuela, and especially the worst nightmare of all:
the growing instability of Saudi Arabia.
Saudi Arabia alone produces over 10% of the
world’s oil. In 1979, when the revolution of the
ayatollahs caused the withdrawal of Iranian oil from
the market, even though the volume of Iran’s oil
production is not comparable with that of Saudi Arabia
the price per barrel soared to a level which would be
equivalent to US$ 100 today. What would happen if
something similar took place in Saudi Arabia? I am
singling out these two factors, the war economy and
oil, for a very simple reason: they both affect the sense
of security of those who have to take investment
decisions.
The world economy will only grow at a satisfactory
rate if the level of investment is increasingly high. In a
situation like that of the present, where the main
concern is insecurity and the unpredictability of a war
economy and of oil prices, no major new investment
trends are to be expected. I believe this is an extremely
important factor in the present situation, although there
are many others to which I will not refer here. Even
so, we have been fortunate in that, after the brief
recession in 2001, which followed, among other things,
the big rise in oil prices in 2000, the world economy
nevertheless began to recover to the point where there
are already growth estimates of around 4% for this
year. This is largely due to the growth of China and
India and the recovery of the United States economy,
although the latter is already beginning to raise doubts
because of the less promising results of the second half
of 2004 and the enormous increase, by over US$ 9
billion, in the trade deficit of that country in June.
This climate of growth has brought with it a
revival of world trade, which, after an exceptional year
in 2000, with growth of over 13%, followed by a
contraction of –1% in 2001 and some signs of recovery
in 2002, turned in a growth rate of 4.5% in 2003. The
excellent Preliminary Overview of the Economies of
Latin American and the Caribbean 2003, published by
ECLAC in December of that year, showed how this
growth has enabled Latin America to post several new
records for export growth, a trade surplus of US$ 41
billion, and a current account surplus of US$ 6 billion.
The publication in question indicates that nearly all the
countries, with a few notable exceptions, turned in a
good performance. We have already seen the first fruits
of this recovery in trade, and the tendency has been
further accentuated this year. The most conservative
estimates —such as those of the World Trade
Organization (WTO)— indicate that trade could grow by
7% in 2004. The most recent data of the Organisation
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)
point to growth rates of 8.6% this year and possibly
10.2% next year, provided the factors affecting world
growth, such as oil, do not cause too many problems.
It is true that, at least in many continents and
regions, this growth is explained largely by changes in
exchange rates and the prices of goods and services.
This is not so in Latin America, and still less in Asia,
but in Western Europe much of the growth is due rather
to factors connected with exchange rates and prices.
Nevertheless, it must be acknowledged that 2004 has
been an exceptional year in terms of trade, and the
future prospects are good too, as shown by the figures
for next year announced by OECD.
We find ourselves up against a paradox, however:
how is it that in a year in which almost everything is
going so well, only the trade negotiations are going
badly? Normally, when the world economy is growing
and there is a recovery in most commodity prices, the
natural situation is for such negotiations to make
progress. We have recently observed, however, that on
the contrary there were problems in the Cancún
negotiations last year and in the Geneva negotiations
this year, which made no progress right up to the last
moment, raising fears that no agreement would be
reached. The negotiations on the Free Trade Area of
the Americas (FTAA) have practically ceased to exist,
at least in the form in which they were originally
proposed, and FTAA is no longer the same scheme that
was originally proposed 10 years ago. The negotiations
between MERCOSUR and the European Union have
likewise made little headway. Some free trade
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agreements have been signed, such as the one between
Chile and the United States, but none of them could
be called a landmark in terms of important issues. The
agreement between Australia and the United States, for
example, has had practically no immediate positive
impact in thorny areas such as agriculture.
What is the explanation for this apparent
contradiction? In my opinion, the explanation is very
simple: the problems are political rather than economic
or trade-related. Thus, the trade negotiations in GATT,
which concentrated for many years on tariffs for
industrial goods, have practically run out of steam,
because the easy issues have already been dealt with,
and what is left is much more difficult. The hard-core
issues concerning protectionism —what was called at
Geneva the unfinished business of the Tokyo and
Uruguay Rounds (i.e., the unfinished business of all the
rounds)— remain to be solved.
GATT was able to make rapid progress in the
1950s, 1960s and 1970s because it left out the most
difficult issues: agriculture, textiles, clothing, and
footwear and leather products. All these products were
isolated and made subject to special rules.
Progress has been made in the sectors where all
the parties have wanted to make headway, but sooner
or later it will be necessary to deal with the most
fundamental problems. These issues were left aside for
a very good reason, because they are extremely
complex, and now that the day has come to tackle
them, all those concerned are beginning to realize that
the challenge is very great indeed; not something that
is going to disappear after the United States elections.
With regard to agriculture, for example, I am quite sure
that the difficulties will be very great and will last for
many years. This is due not only to the reluctance of
Europe and the United States, but also of big
developing countries such as China, India, etc.
This problem of the current situation had an
encouraging result a few weeks ago: a framework
agreement which merely served to stop the negotiations
from coming to a halt altogether. In reality, if one
analyses the real content of this agreement, it must be
acknowledged that it is extremely minimalist. Its main
advantage is that it avoided the worst: i.e., it prevented
the Doha Round from dying in its tracks. That Round
was due to end in late 2004. If it had not even been
possible to agree to keep on negotiating, it would have
starved to death for want of encouragement. The
agreement which has been reached, which is built on
a number of creative ambiguities, makes it possible for
the negotiations to be resumed next year. This type of
ambiguity exists in the agricultural sector, in the so-
called three pillars of agriculture. With regard to export
subsidies, the idea is accepted that some day, in an
uncertain and unknown future, they must be eliminated.
But when? No-one knows, and the objective can only
be attained if there is parallel progress regarding other
forms of subsidies, credits, food aid, etc.
With regard to internal agricultural support
measures, although it is true that agreement has been
reached in principle on limits which must not be
exceeded, it is also true that it has been agreed, at least
in principle, to take quite a flexible view on the so-
called “blue box”,1 thus opening up the possibility of
allowing countries like the United States to legalize
through the negotiations what they lost under the
dispute settlement system. The agreement does not say
in as many words that this will happen, but it does
leave open that possibility.
With regard to access to markets for agricultural
products, everything remains to be done. The agreement
on industrial products is quite vague, and it does not lay
down any rules for defining whether negotiation in some
sectors where tariffs would be reduced to zero should
be obligatory or voluntary. Some five, six or seven key
questions remain to be settled in the negotiations, and
it is impossible to predict the result.
In spite of all the foregoing, however, the
agreement is undoubtedly a positive step forward and
represents the most that could be achieved at that
moment. It makes it possible to keep the multilateral
system alive, since thanks to it the negotiations can be
resumed with greater enthusiasm, once an unfavourable
political situation has been left behind. I believe there
is a reasonable possibility that these negotiations will
finish, not in 2005 but, at least in terms of their
fundamental aspects, at the end of 2006. The negotiating
mandate giving the Executive the United States Trade
Promotion Authority expires on 1 June 2005, but it
contains an almost automatic renewal clause for two
years, i.e., up to June 2007. In my opinion, the most
likely outcome is that the negotiations will be successful
and there will be steady progress. In other words, I
would wager that the results will be moderately
positive in the not too distant future.
1
 The term “blue box” refers to internal aid measures to limit
production which are specifically devoid of any reduction
commitments, according to the bilateral agreement between the
United States and the European Union.
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IV
Structural changes in the international
trade system
I will now analyse what I consider to be the main
structural changes, not in the areas of political issues
or security, but specifically in the trade system. I will
not try to deal with everything that Prebisch proposed,
but will concentrate on some fundamental aspects of
his thinking, in order to determine how and how far
they have evolved in practice.
I shall refer first of all to the world trade system:
what did Prebisch expect from the institutionalization
of this system? Secondly, I will deal with the export
of manufactures, and thirdly with the real reciprocity
—not the merely legal or apparent reciprocity—
displayed with regard to the developing countries and
the “special and differentiated treatment” under the
Generalized System of Preferences. I will also deal
with the question of services, although these were not
part of Prebisch’s concerns. Finally, I will make some
remarks on a matter which he anticipated very well:
interdependence.
I should like to make it clear that what I will be
doing is simply to set forth the problems, because I do
not really have many proposals to make for their
solution. That is the challenge we will all have to face
in the future. The first problem is that of the
international or multilateral trade system. I will take
as my starting point the great report that Prebisch
presented to the first session of UNCTAD 40 years ago,
in 1964. In that report, Prebisch said that GATT was far
from attaining the universality it needed in order to be
really effective and international. At that time, the
members of GATT numbered a little over 60.
Furthermore, as he said, GATT was not a supranational
organization capable of adopting rules that would
prevail over national laws. In that respect, there has
been rapid progress, since in 1995 the World Trade
Organization (WTO) was set up at the meeting in
Marrakesh, although it did not have the features that
Prebisch had envisaged for an organization of that type.
Nevertheless, the WTO is an organization which has
some supranational features and comes close to
universality, although it is not yet completely universal.
China recently became a member, but countries such
as Iran have not yet been admitted, and political
reasons prevent the initiation of negotiations for this.
Saudi Arabia and the Russian Federation are not
members either, and various countries of the former
Yugoslavia, as well as Vietnam, are still in the
negotiating stage. Even so, the WTO currently has 149
members, which is pretty reasonable in terms of
universality. In this sense, it can be said that the vision
set forth in Prebisch’s report has been turned into
reality.
With regard to the second point, the export of
manufactures, there is no point in repeating what
everybody already knows. For Prebisch, the solution
to the problems of developing countries such as those
of Latin America is industrialization, combined with
the possibility of exporting more and more
manufactures to the centres. His constant struggle was
aimed at opening up the markets of the centres so that
the manufactures of countries on the periphery could
have access to them, and he criticized the reluctance of
the centres to open up their markets for the products of
mature industries. This is an interesting case in which
Prebisch’s expectations have largely been fulfilled, but
the results have not been all that he hoped for.
Today, over 70% of the exports of the developing
countries as a whole are manufactures, albeit with
differing degrees of technological content. The
developing countries’ share in global trade in
manufactures is very high and is growing all the time.
This phenomenon has brought with it two main
problems, however: first, there is a high degree of
concentration of those exports, and second, the export
of manufactures has not always brought the benefits
that Prebisch expected from technological progress and
the increase in productivity and value added.
The first of these problems is clearly visible in the
case of China. Everyone knows that China currently
tends to attract all the mature industries of the world.
The North Americans, for example, have already
transferred to China whole segments of their
manufacturing sector which no longer enjoy protection
in the United States. The products of those industries
are no longer manufactured in the United States, but
United States companies produce them in China with
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Chinese labour. The same occurs in the case of many
other products in which China has advantages,
especially in terms of labour costs, with the result that
entire industries have migrated to China.
The case of Brazil is well known. In the 1970s,
Brazil was the main exporter of footwear to the United
States. Today, however, Brazil provides only 6% of
United States imports of footwear, while China
provides over 60%. To some extent, the transfer of
mature industries has also acted to the detriment of
other developing countries. It is not only a question of
the Mexican maquila industry, where it is well known
the Mexico has lost 250,000 jobs in this sector in recent
years. Other countries, such as Vietnam, are also
following the same path. In other words, it may be said
that the phenomenon of increased exports of
manufactures has basically been concentrated in East
Asia. Even among the other Asian countries, there is
now a tendency to transfer those industries to China
and Vietnam. Taiwan, for example, is holding on to
research and design activities in the field of electronic
goods but increasingly manufacturing its physical
products in mainland China rather than on the island.
This phenomenon has done nothing to benefit Latin
America.
The second problem is that it is not enough to
export manufactures with a high content of technology:
what really matters is the value added in such exports.
What is the increase in what might be called the index
of value added in the manufacture of export products?
What has happened is that many countries which
export technologically sophisticated products do so
basically on production lines in which they import the
inputs, assemble them, and then re-export them. This
is what occurs in the maquila firms, but it is not the
only case in which the actual value added is relatively
insignificant.
The contribution to the local economy made by
this type of activity does exist, and it is positive in
terms of employment, wages and other aspects, but it
has nothing to do with Prebisch’s dream of real
technological progress that spreads to the whole of the
economy. In a way, these activities tend to be enclaves
within an economy and have few linkages with the
other sectors.
What has happened in this respect in comparison
with what was envisaged in the 1960s? In those days,
economists did not have any clear idea of a
phenomenon to which we are completely accustomed
today: that production would cease to be of a national
nature. Through the transnational corporations,
production has come to be broken down into stages,
which these firms allocate to their various subsidiaries
for the production of particular goods or services in
order to obtain economies of scale through
specialization. What is strange is that this phenomenon
has been ignored for so long, because in Latin America
we were witnesses of the beginning of this tendency
long before anyone talked about globalization. When
I was a young man, I lived in Buenos Aires as the
officer in charge of the Brazilian trade office. At that
time, Brazil still exported to Argentina the same
products as in the nineteenth century —pinewood,
yerba mate, bananas and coffee— and this began to
change thanks to an idea put forward by ECLAC and
Prebisch: the Latin American Free Trade Association
(LAFTA), which was formed as a result of the 1960
Treaty of Montevideo. That treaty opened up the
possibility of negotiating what were called sectoral
integration agreements. What happened, however, was
that we Latin Americans did not have continental-level
firms. Our firms were national, local, provincial and
those who took full advantage of the treaty were
companies like IBM, Olivetti or Burroughs, which made
use of these agreements by dividing up their production
lines and manufacturing some things in Mexico and
others in Argentina or Brazil. This was the beginning
of what would later become one of the two great
motive forces of globalization. One was the revolution
in telecommunications and information technology,
while the other was the internationalization of
production and distribution chains.
What Prebisch had in mind when he advocated the
transfer of mature industries to Latin America was a
national system of integrated production. He had not
anticipated that this would take place as it did. It may
be added that there is something we have always lacked
and still do not have: an awareness of the need to
promote services. We are now witnessing an
extraordinary phenomenon in this respect in India,
which is already exporting over US$ 15 billion in
services through external subcontracting, software and
the operation of call centres.
Some Caribbean countries are also doing this, but
in Latin America we are still not really prepared to take
advantage of the great potential of services.
The developing countries talk a lot about
manufacturing but very little about services, which is
a sector in which all of them are very vulnerable. India,
for example, is very concerned about this, because in
this field there are no clear legal commitments designed
to protect subcontracting. If tomorrow a country like
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the United States or France decides to take measures
against external subcontracting, those measures will not
be considered illegal, because among other things —and
this is a really ironical situation— few of the
developing countries have adhered to the Tokyo Round
agreement on public sector purchases, which is where
protectionist-minded politicians now want to impose
limits.
Today, both ECLAC and UNCTAD are working harder
in this respect and addressing problems to which we
had perhaps failed to pay due attention: i.e., those on
the supply side of the production system. Through the
important work of Fernando Fajnzylber, ECLAC put
forward the issue of changing production patterns with
social equity. Even so, not much progress has been
made in this field either in changing production
patterns or in equity.
Undeniably, we are tending to go back to the past
in terms of exports. There are some worthy exceptions,
but in general we are returning to a situation of
specialization in products based on natural resources.
The case of Brazil is typical. Except for some examples
such as the sale of aircraft by EMBRAER, Brazil’s main
export successes are in the field of agro-industry
(basically agriculture and stock-raising).
Another issue of a more structural nature is that
of trade blocs. This was not one of the subjects dealt
with by Prebisch: quite to the contrary. He wanted to
achieve the integration of Latin America and of the
developing countries in general. Until recently, there
was a great deal of talk about how the world was on
the way towards splitting up into three great trade
blocs: Europe, with the Euro as its currency; ourselves
and the United States in the Western Hemisphere, with
the dollar, and the Asians, with Japan and the yen. This
has only occurred in part, however. The great bloc
which has really arisen is that of the Asians with the
United States. The real situation of the world trade
system and the world system of payments is that the
Asians are growing thanks to the United States market
and are buying dollars and Treasury bonds so that the
North Americans can continue to be not so much
lenders of last resort as consumers of last resort.
We have reached a very curious situation of
symbiosis. Someone said that today there are only two
kinds of developing countries. In the first category are
those that finance their development by exporting to
the United States and building up reserves which
prevent the depreciation of their currencies vis-à-vis the
dollar, while at the same time protecting them from the
volatility of world financial resources. These are Asian
countries, especially China and of course Japan, which
is one of the main members of this group. The other
category of developing countries, which includes the
Latin American countries, comprises those that do not
manage to finance their needs with their exports and
have to do so by resorting to indebtedness.
This system has some disturbing features, since
it is based on the almost unlimited capacity of the
United States to absorb all the world’s imports. I
always compare that country with the black holes in
astronomy. The United States is receiving 10% of
world saving. Nothing like this has ever been seen
before. It is the great consumer, while at the same time
it is financed by the other countries. It has a trade
deficit of over 5% of its GDP which continues to grow
in spite of the relative depreciation of the dollar vis-à-
vis the European currencies. Thus, it is the Europeans
who are paying for all this. This is the real situation,
rather than the blocs referred to in the past. The fact is
that the United States has never accepted regional
limits on its actions. Among the free trade agreements
it has signed are treaties with Jordan, Morocco, and
with African countries under its special “African
Opportunity Act”. The United States does not accept
the idea that Africa is the backyard of the European
countries, and it is disputing that situation inch by inch.
Prebisch envisaged reciprocity in real, and not
merely legal, terms. This means a form of reciprocity
which takes account of the differences in level of
development and economic structure between
countries. This gave rise to his idea of the Generalized
System of Preferences, which was established at the
first session of UNCTAD but which has not been adopted
in the way that he expected.
Prebisch wanted the system to be multilateral, and
not a unilateral system in which each country discusses
and decides how it wants the preferences to be. All
these ideas are now under heavy pressure in two
different directions. There is a growing tendency
towards the multiplication of bilateral or regional free
trade agreements; these agreements almost always
completely or largely ignore the differences in level of
development and impose a more legalistic type of
reciprocity. In addition to this phenomenon, there is
another point which must be taken into account: the
fact that Prebisch’s thinking, or that of UNCTAD in 1964,
which saw the developing countries as a compact,
almost undifferentiated universe, does not correspond
to the new realities of the world.
One of those new realities is the appearance on
the scene of China: something that no-one could have
C E P A L  R E V I E W  8 4  •   D E C E M B E R  2 0 0 4
THE RENEWED CURRENCY OF RAÚL PREBISCH • RUBENS RICUPERO
17
imagined back in 1964, on the eve of the Cultural
Revolution. Is China a developing country, or is it
rather a developed country with a capacity to compete
in line with very special economic rules? Generally
speaking, the Asia-Pacific phenomenon stands at the
other extreme from the so-called less developed
countries: the 50 countries which are the poorest of the
poor, the indigents of the world. In order to enter this
category of the United Nations, it is necessary to be
so poor that of the 35 countries of the Western
Hemisphere, which of course includes Latin America,
only Haiti is among those 50, out of which 34 are
African, while East Timor has been the last country to
join this group. Clearly, these countries are
heterogeneous and they are very different from the
Latin American countries, both in their history and
their economic structure. Many of them have a
practically subsistence-level agricultural economy.
They are at a very different stage from that of the Latin
American countries. What I am about to say will upset
some developing countries, but this differentiation will
sooner or later be reflected in the trade rules.
It is very difficult to imagine how countries like
China, India, Brazil, Argentina and others can receive
the same treatment as Burundi, Benin, Chad, Rwanda,
Tanzania or Bhutan. Differentiation is one of the great
challenges that is facing us. I could say a great deal
more on this problem, but here I will limit myself to
noting that this is one of the issues that were not clearly
identified or dealt with in Prebisch’s agenda.
I would not like to close my analysis of the
changes in the world trade system without at least
mentioning two fundamental matters. One is that we
are witnessing a change in the very bases of the
multilateral trade system. This system developed from
the nineteenth century onwards on the basis of the
principle of non-discrimination and the most-favoured-
nation clause, which are expressed in the first two
articles of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.
The proliferation of free trade agreements which
exploit in a very dangerous way the terms of article
24 of the General Agreement, however, has permitted
the continual erosion of that principle. In order to
justify this erosion, it is claimed that free trade
agreements are the elements with which to build a trade
system which is totally free of hindrances. In reality,
however, this is not the case, since very often those
treaties create hindrances that did not exist before. To
give only one example: the North American Free Trade
Agreement has established rules of origin for textiles
or automobile parts which did not exist before and
which constitute new hindrances to the free flow of
goods.
I witness this trend with great concern because,
as a former Chairman of the Contracting Parties of
GATT, I feel that it is my duty to defend the multilateral
trade system. I also find it a matter of serious concern
that, out of the whole trade of the United States, over
40% is governed by rules on preferences.
Anyone who speaks of such rules is automatically
talking about rules that are discriminatory, for a very
simple reason: “preference” means choosing one
country or thing over another. Such differentiation is
therefore automatically discriminatory. I often get the
impression that what is happening today with regard
to the system of trade is rather similar to what
happened between 1971 and 1973, when a series of ad
hoc spot decisions taken unilaterally by President
Nixon practically wiped out the bases of the Bretton
Woods system, at least as regards two of its
cornerstones: a system of reasonably stable exchange
rates, and full and free convertibility between the dollar
and gold. The institutions set up as a result of Bretton
Woods have survived: the International Monetary Fund
(IMF) is still there, but we now have a system of
fluctuating exchange rates which has nothing to do with
what was agreed upon in the Articles of Agreement of
the IMF in 1944. The IMF is now something else, a
completely different system, and I fear that something
similar is happening with the multilateral trade system.
It is not that the system is going to die away, but it is
being radically changed.
The second matter is the idea of interdependence,
which was so important to Prebisch, who continually
insisted that it was in the interest of the North —for its
own benefit, of course— to promote the industrialization
of the South. Prebisch always persisted with this idea:
that progress —the industrialization of the South—
would create an ever-growing demand for the
sophisticated products and technology of the North
which would represent an additional source of demand.
This is currently being proved in the case of China, to
a spectacular extent. No-one could ever deny that this
is the role that China is now playing, above all with
respect to Japan. It is well known that one of the main
causes of the recent improvement in Japan’s position
is its export trade with China, which is growing
extraordinarily fast. The same is also true not only with
respect to the United States and many Asian countries,
but also Argentina and Brazil, for which China has
recently been the recipient of 10% and 7% of their
exports, respectively. This role that the growth of the
South can play in terms of boosting world trade is not
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in the least to the detriment of the North, since it helps
to increase the demand for the goods of countries like
the United States.
It is interesting, for example, to observe what is
happening in the case of South Korea and also
Malaysia and other Asian countries. For these nations,
over the last two or three years China has become their
main market, surpassing that of the United States. It
might even be thought that they could do without the
latter country, but that is not so, for in the final analysis
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the United States will always be important. What does
China import from South Korea? It imports different
kinds of electronic components that the Chinese then
use on their assembly lines, incorporate in finished
products, and re-export to the United States. Thus, at
the end of the line there is the great “black hole” of
the United States market. Once again, we have this
gigantic bloc to take into account, so that South-South
trade is not an alternative, but something that exists
side by side with North-South trade.
V
By way of conclusion
In conclusion, I should like to quote a statement by
Prebisch which I always like to recall, because it forms
part of the final section of his report to the first session
of UNCTAD, 40 years ago. It has a great deal to do, not
so much with the matters dealt with in this article, as
with the underlying problems. As you will have noted,
in most cases I have not offered solutions but instead
have set out the problems that we will have to face.
Prebisch (1964) said in this respect: “Realism is
also foresight, and an elementary sense of foresight
should cause us to interpret the trend of the events that
are occurring in the developing world”. For this, he
went on, the pages of his report were “an act of faith
regarding the possibility of persuading and
compenetrating with these ideas where it is necessary
to penetrate and where there is a possibility of giving
rise to constructive reactions”.
He concluded his exhortation as follows:
“The facts are there, it cannot be denied. And if
the ways of facing them suggested here are not
acceptable, then we must seek other ways which are.
Because the problem is inescapable. The world had
never had to face it in this form or in these dimensions.
Nor had the world ever had the enormous possibilities it
now has to solve it, however, or the conviction —which
is growing every day— that it is also possible to act
in a conscious and deliberate way on the forces of
technology and economics in pursuit of grand designs”.
(Original: Spanish)
